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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS
GFNERAL PRiN'cIPLES"
Questions concerning the legal effects of a reservation to an
international compact have occupied the attention of writers in
international law to an increasing degree during the present cell-
tury. --Much work-has .-been done in codifying .and analysing the
procedures to be followed when a state, signatory to a treaty,
wishes to declare that it will not be bound by"a particular provi-
sion thereof.1
Often the subject of. the reservation- is'raised during negotia-
tion of the treaty. Where it is then disposed of by an alteration
of the terms of the. instrument, no further action is necessary.
But a state ma-y- raise an- objection to a prdvision of a -treaty
already drafted by attaching a reservation to .its signature, and
recording it in a.pr.Pros-verbal, or protocol of signatures; -or, if
the reservation is' made after signature, by "attaching it to the
ratification. Finally,, if -the reserving sfae "-is -not an original
signatory, but wishes to accede to the treaty, it may attach the
reservation to its accession.'
Definitions of a-reservation are legion; one which has gained
general recognition as- authoritative appeared in the 1935 Harvard
Research in. Inter ational Law:
A "reservatibn'--is- a -formal declaration by- which a state,
when signing, ratifying or acceding to a treaty, specifies as a
condition of its willingness to become a party to the treaty cer-
tain terms which limit the- effect -of- the treaty in so far as it
may apply in -the relations of that state with the..olher state.or.
s te.q which .may be p-rties to the treaty.3
The term ."reservation ' has also been used as a synonym
for "amendment:' ;4 bit.'these should be distingished. An'amend-
ment comprises an alteratioi in the treaty it-gelf ; upon its accept-
ance *by- the- contracting parties, it binds them-all in -their multi-
1. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 821-822 (7th ed.-Lauterpacht, 1948) ; 2 HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS.INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES§ 519 (2d ed. 1945) ; 5 M'MooRg, DrGLST OF INTERNATIOIAL-LAw 201 (1906) ; Harvard
Research inIntcruaional .Law---aw of Treaties, 29 Am..J Iirx'I L, SuPP. 843-912
(1935), are afhong the basic works which have discussed the criteria and problems of
reservations.
2. These procedures are outlined in 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 822.
3. Harvard Resiar-h- 'na4ern&Aanal Law-Law-f-T-ea'ies, 29 Am. J. INT'L L.
SuPp. 843 et seq. (1935). This definition has been quoted in 5 HACKWOEXI, INTPRNA-
TroNAL..LAw. 101-102 -(.1943); and has been used in textbooks as %01-4 -e.'.g. Bisnov,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-97 (1953).
.4. 58 Cong. Rec. .3302 (1919); qut.ed in 5 HACKWW11H, Op. cit. supra note 3.
at- 102-103.
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lateral relationships. But a reservation is unilateral in nature,
.and- merely connotes that the reserving state will not be bound by
-a'.'speaific provision of the treaty. The fact that, traditionally,
consent of all the contracting parties has been deemed necessary
for a reservation to become effertive may have resulted in some
confusion between the two; and the reciprocal nature of .most
reservations undoubtedly. has operated to obscure the important
'distinctions between a reservation and an amendment.
The reciprocal application of a reservation is not really
analogous to the operation of an amendment, for while the other
contracting parties may avail themselves of the terms of the
reservation in a transaction to which the reserving state is a party
(i. e., may assert the immunity from normal operation of the
treaty, just as the reserving state can), this is possible only vis-d-
vis the reserving state itself. A state may not utilize the reserva-
tion in its relations with other non-reserving states.5
This general rule of reciprocity may be modified by a declara-
tion by the reserving state that its reservation shall not apply
in favor of any other state. Such a statement is thought to abro-
gate the reciprocal effect of a reservation, although the logical
basis of this conclusion is not unassailable.6 As a practical mat-
ter, if the other signatories assent to this "reservation on a
reservation", they will not later seek to take advantage of the
reciprocal protection which otherwise would have been accorded
them.
States have frequently thought it necessary to expressly
reserve their right to claim the advantage of reciprocity in the
legal effect of a reservation;7 .sometimes despite their announced
view that reciprocity is automatic."
Also to be distinguished from a reservation is a mere "state-
ment of interpretation", which may accompany ratification or
accession by a state. Such statements, usually embodied in a
procas-verbal, have no binding effect. They operate merely to
place on record a state's position with regard to a clause suscept-
5. If one state claims that another has violated a term of the treaty, the accused
state can show that by reason of the reservation, the reserving state (not a party to
this dispute) has made performance impossible. But this is thought to be the only
instance when two non-reserving parties may be affected by the reservation of a third
state. See, Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 3.
6. Id. at 869.
7. Wright, The United States and the Permanent Court of International Justice,
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION,, No. 232, at 341, 353 ;. see,, e. g., PROTOCOL, CONVENTION
ON CusToMs FoRMALITIs (2 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1120); GENERAL
TREATY OF INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, ART. 8 (PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES IN CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, WASHINGTON,
D. C. at 666 (1929).
... 8. Wright, op. cit. supra note 7, at 822.
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ible of differing interpretations. Of course, if ratification or ac-
cession to the treaty is expressly conditioned upon acceptance of
the proposed interpretation, it may properly be termed a reserva-
tion.
Finally, a reservation must be distinguished from a "condi-
tional acceptance", which does not purport to limit the effect of
the treaty, but usually provides that the acceptance shall not take
effect until the occurrence of a specified event; usually, when cer-
tain other states have signified their acceptance or ratification of
the treaty. Once effective, the acceptance is without reservation.
Tr.iB REQuIREMENT OF CONSENT
It is axiomatic that no state can be compelled to enter into
an international treaty or convention. The formation of such
agreements is purely voluntary. This principle emerges inevitably
from the facts of the contemporary international legal order. It
does not follow inexorably, however, that once having signified
its intention to 'be bound by a treaty, a state may, without restric-
tion, immunize itself against the operation of its substantive pro-
visions. For a state to possess the power to bind others without
binding itself would defeat the objects of international covenants,
and undermine the implicit consideration advanced during nego-
tiation. Clearly, most treaties, like contracts, are the product of
bargaining in which each party steels itself to accept unwanted
clauses in the expectation that the other fellow will do the same.
A reservation involves "the refusal of an offer and the making
of a fresh offer." 9 Of course, the analogy between a private con-
tract and a treaty cannot be pressed too far, but it is valuable
for an understanding of the general view that a state may make
reservations only where it can secure the consent, express or im-
plied, of other parties to the instrument.10
That the required consent need not be formal is agreed.
Sometimes consent is given in advance, during the conference
preceding formation of the treaty. Thus, the parties may tacitly
agree that a state which desires to make a reservation and declares
its intention at the conference may renew the reservation when
signing the treaty without waiting for the formalities of assent
by the other parties. 1
Also, a treaty may contain express provisions concerning
conditions under which reservations will be accepted; e. g., Art. 67
of the International Sanitary Convention of 1933 provided:
9. 1 OPPENHEIm, op. cit. mspra note 1, at 822.
10. Ibid.; McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES: BRITIsH PRACTICE AND OPINIONS
105-111 (1938).
11. 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 822.
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The signature of the present Convention shall not be accom-
panied by any reservation which has not previously been ap-
proved by the High Contracting Parties who are already signa-
tories. Moreover, ratifications or accessions cannot be accepted
if they are accompanied by reservations which have not pre-
viously been approved by all the countries participating in the
Convention.12
A treaty may expressly preclude reservations; e. g., Art. 1
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Also, it has been
concluded that draft Labor Conventions adopted by the Confer-
ence of the International Labor Organization are intrinsically
incapable of being ratified subject to reservations. In its report
to the Council of the League of Nations, the Committee for the
Progressive Codification of International Law added the following
general statement:
In order that any reservation whatever may be validly made
in regard to a clause of the treaty, it is essential that this reser-
vation should be accepted by all the contracting parties, as
would have been the case if it had been put forward in the
course of the negotiations. If not, the reservation, like the sig-
nature to which it is attached, is null and void.' 3
Consent has been implied from the failure to object to a pro-
posed reservation. Where the parties to a multilateral treaty,
aware of the existence of the reservation, neither assent nor dis-
sent expressly, it is thought that the lapse of a reasonable time
would permit an inference that the parties had assented, and the
signature, ratification or accession would become effective with
the reservation.' 4 It has been suggested, however, that the mere
failure to object does not indicate acquiescence on the part of
states which have already ratified the treaty, although subsequent
accessions would imply acceptance of known pre-existing reserva-
tions. 5 Hackworth also states the view that where some of the
parties have assented to a reservation, but others have signified
objections thereto, some treaties may be susceptible of limited
application despite the fact that not all the signatories have rati-
fied; while if a treaty expressly requires ratification by all the
signatories, or a -specified number of them, it could not become
operative if the reservation were not accepted by a sufficient num-
ber of signatories. 6
12. U. S. Treaty Ser., No. 19 (Dep't State 1935).
13. PUBLIcATIoNs OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1927 V. 16. The report of the
Committee, together with a resolution on the subject, was adopted by the League
Council on June 17, 1927. The entire report and resolution is also found in McNAm,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 107-111.
14. McNAIR, op. cit. .ipra note 10, at 106.
15. 5 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 130-131 (1943).
16. Ibid.
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At this point it may be apropos to define the terms
"signatory", "accession" and "ratification". A signatory is any
state which has, by its authorized representatives, indicated its
assent to a treaty and its willingness to be bound by it; but the
assent is not complete until the constitutional process of ratifica-
tion is concluded. Am accession is an act of adherence to a treaty
that has been ratified by the required number of signatories, but
remains open for other states to become parties.
Treaties often contain a provision that they shall not become
operative until the ratifications of a given number of signatories
are deposited. When the required number of ratifications are
completed, the treaty has been ratified in the international-law
sense of the word. Individual acts of acceptance by the parties
are ratifications in the constitutional sense, in that they are the
product of the domestic constitutional processes of each state.
It has been suggested that a nation may bind itself inter-
nationally by mere signature without the constitutionally required
act of ratification, in the absence of a special requirement to the
contrary in the treaty. 7 But this statement has been criticized
as "too sweeping."'' Oppenheim suggests that whether a treaty
requires constitutional ratification by the parties depends on the
contents of the compact. If the subject matter constitutionally
requires ratification, the treaty cannot become operative unless
the acceptances are based on domestic acts of ratification, which
are usually parliamentary in nature.
In the 1935 Harvard Research. in Internationl Law, it was
stated:
A State is not bound by a treaty made on its behalf by an
organ or authority not competent under its law to conclude a
treaty; however, a State may be responsible for an injury re-
sulting to another state from reasonable reliance by the latter
upon a representation that such organ or authority was compe-
tent to conclude the treaty.' 9
Even this considerably diluted view of the ability of a state
to bind itself despite constitutional limitations is open to doubt.
The argument that a state may be liable to those who "reasonably
rely" on its representatives, seems to be based on analogy from
17. Fitzmaurice, Do Treaties Need Ratification? 15 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 113-137 (1934).
18. 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1. at 816.
19. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 2 at 653, 992. Accord:
McNair, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Treaty-Making Power, in ARNOLD,
TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE 6 (1933). McNair states that there is "considerable au-
thority" for the view that international law imputes to a state an agreement made on
its behalf by its representatives, without regard for constitutional limitations. LAw or
TREATIES: BRITISH PRACTICE AND OPINIONS 38 et seq. (1938).
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the -law of Agency. Indeed, Fitzmaurice bases the view on the
theory that no state may be presumed to know the intricacies of
foreign constitutional processes, and therefore, states are justified
in relying on agents of other states.2" But certainly the state
whose representatives are thought to bind it without the aid of
its constitution is not an undisclosed principal; and so long as the
constitution and laws of a state are published and available it
would appear rather myopic to argue that State A need not be
aware of State B's constitution.
This very question has received consideration by the United
Nations. In a report on its Second Session, the International Law
Commission observed that ". . precise knowledge of consti-
tutional provisions of other countries is essential to those who in
any country are engaged in negotiating treaties."'"
The result of this report was the publication by the United
Nations of a slim volume titled: 'Laws and Practices Concerning
the Conclusion of Treaties',22 in which relevant constitutional
texts and other information concerning national laws and prac-
tices regarding the conclusion of treaties were compiled. Surely
it is now more difficult to plead ignorance of constitutional provi-
sions of other states. It would appear, therefore, that constitu-
tional ratification is now a practical prerequisite to acceptance of
an international treaty obligation, even if this were .not always,
true in the past.
Despite conflicting views as to the necessity and legal effect
of ratification in the constitutional sense, the authorities appear
to have been in remarkable unanimity on the fundamental propo-
sition that a reservation could not become operative until it re-
ceived the consent of the other contracting parties. Analysis of
a number of reservations indicated that in every instance the
parties implicitly accepted the above principle. 23  At least one
other study followed this, and arrived at the same conclusion.24
THE AmERiCAN RESERVATION
Such was the state of international law, therefore, when,
in 1946, the United States acceded to Article 36 of the Statute
20. Fitzmaurice, loc. cit. supra note 17.
21. Report on the Second Session of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly of the United Nations, U. N. GEN. ASSELy OFF. RmC., 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 12. A/1316, p. 10.
22. U. N. LEGISLATIVE SERIES, St/Leg/Ser. B/3 (1953).
23. Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 BITiSH YEARBooK OF
INTERNATioNAL LAw 141-162 (1926). See also, Wright, Amendments and Reservations
to the Treaty, 4 MiNN. L. REv. 14 et seq. (1919-20).
24. Hudson, Reservations to Multipartite International Instruments, 32 Am. J.
INT'L L. 330-335 (1938).
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of the International Court of Justice, conferring compulsory juris-
diction on the court for the adjudication of international disputes
to which the United States is a party. The American acceptance
of the "Optional Clause" was significant for at least two reasons:
1. It marked the first time that the United States had signi-
fied its assent to the sweeping jurisdictional terms of the Statute.
For under the Optional Clause of its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, which contained substantially iden-
tical provisions, the United States twice attempted to accede.
Each time its acceptance was hedged about with reservations
which effectively curbed the possible impact of the Court on
American interests; but despite the protection offered by the
reservations to the proposed accessions, they twice failed of un-
qualified approval.25  Thus, the 1946 acceptance, adopted by a
resounding 62-2 vote in the Senate, was hailed as a great advance
in the peripatetic quest for an international juridical order.2
2. The American acceptance was significant also for another,
less auspicious, reason: it contained a reservation (among others)
which by its terms appeared to some observers to sweep away the
jurisdiction it apparently had conferred on the Court. This was
the famous "domestic jurisdiction" reservation:
such declaration shall not apply to . . . (c) dis-
putes with regard to matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the
United States . 27
The Charter of the United Nations explicitly exempts domes-
tic questions from international jurisdiction, both political and
legal:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
member to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter . 28
Indeed, it has been an axiom of international law for cen-
turies that international law cannot intervene or exercise any
jurisdiction over matters which are essentially domestic in nature,
and which impinge upon the sovereignty of -a state. Despite this
25. For the history of both failures, see 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw, 142-143; id., Vol. 6. 72-75 (1943).
26. Wilcox, The United States Accepts Compulsory Jurisdiction, 40 Am. J. INT'L
L. 699-719 (1946).
27. Senate Resolution 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
28. U. N. CHARTER, Art. 2 § 7.
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apparently clear-cut rule of law, the United States Senate found
it necessary to insist upon the reservation mentioned above.
An exemption of domestic questions from the jurisdiction of
the Court would appear prima facie to -be nothing more than a
reaffirmation of existing law. To this extent it would be, although
unnecessary, fully consonant with the purposes of the Court. In
fact, the United States would not have been the first state to spell
out in its acceptance the exclusion of domestic questions from
international legal jurisdiction."
However, no other state had ever reserved to itself the right
to decide whether a dispute was "domestic." In this respect the
American reservation was singular, for by an assertion that a
given matter lies within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States, this country could denude the Court of jurisdiction.80
This last provision has been the subject of protracted, though
scholarly, debate. It has been pointed out that the reservation is
in contradiction of the express terms of Article 36, Par. 6 of the
Statute, which states: "In the event of a dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the deci-
sion of the Court." Also, it has been observed that the reserva-
tion constitutes a "bad example"; and that it deprives the Court
of an essential element of judicial authority, for the competence
of a court to decide whether it has jurisdiction of the subject-
matter is deemed to be one of the foundations of any effective
judicial institution, domestic or international. Finally, the un-
wisdom of the American reservation has been indicated by the
fact that, having regard for the general principle of reciprocal
applicability of reservations, the United States might someday
find its way to the Court as a claimant barred by the other party
to a dispute, asserting the protection of the American reserva-
tion, and announcing that the dispute was essentially a domestic
question. In view of this country's history as primarily a claim-
ant state before international tribunals, this last point is not
lacking in cogency. 1
29. Of the forty-five members accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the old
Permanent Court, some fifteen inserted reservations concerning domestic matters. See
Wilcox, op. cit. supra note 26, at 711; and, Williams, The Optional Clause, 11 BRITISH
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-80 (1930), for a discussion of the British reserva-
tion on domestic questions.
30. The Permanent Court of International Justice ruled on five cases involving
attacks on its jurisdiction. In two of them it ruled that jurisdiction was lacking, in two
others that it was present, and in the fifth case it ruled that the objection was "well-
founded." As Wilcox points out (op. cit. supra note 26, at 711) : " . . . in each case
the Court and not the states decided the issue . . ." See, HUDSON, THE PERMANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942, 477-481.
31. These arguments are stated in Preuss, The International Court of Justice, The
Senate, and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 720-736 (1946) ; and
in Wilcox, op. cit. supra note 26, passimn.
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Defenders of the reservation have pointed out that the defi-
nition of the term "domestic questions" or words of similar im-
port changes with the times; and that what would have been con-
sidered as a purely domestic matter in earlier years is often
thought of today as a problem fraught with international ramifi-
cations. This constant alteration of. the concept of domestic
questions is thought to be almost a mathematical function of
modern technological and cultural advances. In these circum-
stances, it is argued, the United States can scarcely be blamed for
asserting its desire to insulate itself from the possible future
decisions and viewpoints in international law which could narrow
the concept of domesticity even further, and thus erode the prin-
ciple of national sovereignty. It is further suggested that al-
though the United States reservation contains sweeping terms,
in practice political considerations would preclude us from acting
peremptorily in invoking the reservation.2
In any event, the discordant views described above did not
prevent the American accession, complete with reservations, from
being duly deposited, without audible objection from other states.
Today the United States is a formal party to the Optional Clause.
TnE COMPATIBILITY TEST
In 1951, the International Court of Justice delivered an ad-
visory opinion on the question of legal effects of proposed reser-
vations to the Genocide Convention.33 As will be shown below,
this opinion, and the views reflected by its critics, raise the ques-
tion, quite apart from any considerations of political wisdom and
usage, whether the American reservation may not have legal im-
plications far greater than those hitherto suggested.
As a result of reservations which had been proposed to the
Genocide Convention by several countries, to which objections
had been raised, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
called the attention of the General Assembly to the problem of
determining what were the legal effects of these reservations, and
the status of their authors as parties to the Convention. In his
memorandum to the Assembly, the Secretary-General embraced
generally the dominant view that:
32. Wilcox, op. cit. stpra note 26, at 709 et seq.; also see generally on the question
of changing concepts of domestic questions, Brierly, Matters of Domestic JurisdictLion, 6
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-19 (1925); and Fenwick, The Scope of
Domestic Questions in International Law, 19 Am. J. INTL L. 143-147 (1925).
33. 1. C. J. Reports 15 (1951) ; 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 579 (1951).
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.A state may make. a reservation when signing, ratifying or
acceding to a convention, prior to its entry into force, only with
the consent of all states which have ratified or acceded thereto
up to the date of entry into force; and may do so after the date
of &ntiy info force only with the consent of all states which
have heretofore ratified- or acceded.3 4
The Secretary-General felt that this practice accorded withi
the procedure followed by the League of Nations, and- that it- was
consonant -with usual international practice. While the' consent
of mere signatories could not be required, that of nations'which
had ratified or acceded to the -convention was a.prerequisite for
validation of a reserving state's acceptance. --
As the membraiidum pointed out, this is in sharp contrast to
the practice of the Pan-American Union and. theQrganization of
American States, under .which the objection of a.party does not
prevent the reserving state from becoming a pairty, with the only
juridical consequence :of rejection- being that the- convention does
not enter into force as between- the reserving and the rejecting
state. This, as. between n6ni-eserving states', thea-convention's
terms obtain with full-force and effect' As between-the i6serving
state and those which have accepted the reservation, the -conven-
tion operates as modified by the reservation; and .as. between the
reserving- state and those which refused to accept the reserva-
tion, the convention is not-in force.3 5 .  -
The Secretary-General refused to adopt the "compromise"
position of the Organization of American States, however, and
except for xestrieting the right of objection to states which have
ratified or acceded -to the treaty, the position of the Secretary-
General remained- squarely in favor of the requirement of con-
sent.
In a memorandumi dnfieked-to Ih re.r- it, the' UnifedKi ngdom
delegation observed -tha".
Ain international conventioii is-an- integral. whole afid
must be: accepted or -not accepted as a'whole. It cannot be ac-
cepted in part. Derogations may exceptionally be permitted to
meet the special circumstances of particular countries, provided
they receive the consent of the other interested parties, but-no
state can claim a right to make such reservations unilaterally,
or .accept those paits of a convention which suit it while exclud-
ing those parts it disagrees with 6r does not feel. it can- carry
-out 6
24.--Mefiioiancuin o-'Set 20, -1950- 4UN Dectuimnt -A/37I2)
35. See, Sanders, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties Made in the Act of Rati-
f.abnA a F ea-ernCe, 3J A. J. INT'L L. Al, 49V-(I9)7
36. Loc. cit. supra note 34.
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Other nations objected, however, on the ground that under the
strict rule of consent the objection of a nation to a relatively
minor reservation could operate as a veto power, precluding the
reserving state from becoming a party to the convention.
Finally the matter was forwarded to the International Court
of Justice for an advisory opinion, and to the International Law
Commission for study. On May 28, 1951, the Court rendered its
advisory opinion, and by seven votes to five rejected the strict
principle of consent in favor of a set of rules partly reminiscent
of the Pan-American- Union. practice, but with significant depar-
tures as well:
(1) . . a State which has made and maintained a reserva-
tion which has been objected to by one or more of the parties
to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a
party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State
cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention . . .
(2) . . . if a party to the Convention objects to a reserva-
tion which 'is considers to be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the re-
serving State is not a party to the Convention; . . . if, on
the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being com-
patible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in
fact consider that the reserving State is a party to the Conven-
tion.
(3) .... an objection to a reservation made by a signatory
State which has not yet ratified the Convention can have . . .
legal effect . . .- only on ratification. Until that moment it
merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual atti-
tude' of 'the-signatory State, ; . :..- an'objeQtion to a reserva-
fion made by a State which is entitled to sign or accede but
which has not yet done so, is without legal effect.37
The Court recognized the principle of-unanimous consent as
well-accepted, but cited:the, practice of' the Organization of Ameri-
can States as indicating:.the need-for "flexibility" in the opera-
tion of the .rule. It characterized its new.. position as a com-
promise between the requirement of consent, which is a guarantee
that no state may unilaterally-frustrate the purposes of a conven-
tion by a far-reaching reservation,-and the need-for-universal ac-
ceptance of the Genoeide Convention. Great emphasis was laid
on the-stated "'uivetsality" of the Convention, and of the
Urt.iaKatins- _Te c.g pronie 4.. theJxefor.e, was That a reser-
vation to which objection was addressed would become effective
37. Supra ftte 33.
228
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only if it were "compatible" with the convention; and this was
to be determined by each objecting state unilaterally.
Several months later, the International Law Commission re-,
ported that the United Nations Secretariat was following sub-
stantially the dominant practice in requiring consent before a
reservation would be permitted.38 In fact, the Commission sug-
gested that the consent rule should be even more stringent, in that
consent of mere signatories should be required as well, except
where a substantial time has elapsed since signature, indicating
that the state has no intention of ratifying.
The Commission noted that while it was desirable that conven-
tions should enjoy the widest possible acceptance, ". . . it may
often be more important to maintain the integrity of a Conven-
tion than to aim, at any price, at the widest possible acceptance
of it. '9
In substance, therefore, the Commission's report was in agree-
ment with the minority of the Court in finding the consent re-
quirement to be valuable and necessary.
One of the problems raised by the Commission report is that
of determining when the text of a convention must be maintained
intact, and when it may be diluted by means of reservations in
order to secure wider acceptance. In other words, at what point
does it become necessary to insist upon the consent of other
parties as a guarantee of .the integrity and purposes, of the con-
vention 740
The view adopted by he majority of the Court in the Genocide
opinion was that the reserving state may jbe .rgarded as a party to
the Convention despite objection if the reservation is "compati-
ble" with the object and purpose of the Convention. In princi-
ple, this would seem to be a valid criterion.
However, the "compatibility" test would be difficult to apply.
According to the Court, the objecting party would determine.
whether a proposed reservation was compatible with the purposes
of the treaty. This practice might well lend itself to a condition
of near-anarchy in international law, with conflicting, positions as
to which states are parties, and to what extent, and vis-a-vis what
.. U...N. Gzx. Asr Ly,.OL RLc.,-h. ss.,Supp-No, 9.(A/-1858) 45 Au.
3. INT'L L. 103 (1951).
39. Ibid.
40. Fenwick, Reservations to Muitilateral Conventions: The Report of the "Inter--.
national Lav Commission, 46 Am. 3. INT', L. 119-123 (1952).
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other states, with the result that no determination of the effect of a
treaty could safely be undertaken.
It has beern suggested that the lhgal Committee of the General
Assembly might be entrusted with the power to decide whether a
disputed reservation was compatible with the terms of a treaty,
with the proviso that despiti a finding of compatibility, the de-
cision -would not affect those states which maintain their opposi-
tioni to the reservation.4- It is doubtful, however, that a state
would be prepared to abdicate to the Legal Committee the power
to determine the compatibility of 'reservations to conventions to
which it is a pary, especially in view of the historic position that
consent of 'the parties is a'prerequigite to validation of the reser-
vation. If states were to permit such an agency _f6 have the power
to determine the compatibility of reservations, however, it could
result in decisions on these questions-being made with closer ref-
erence to the strictly legal problems involved, and, with appro-
priate safeguards, could permit the successful application of the
compatibility test on ai objective, rdther "thain'.a subjective level.
In any event, the decision of the Conrt-represents the high-
est judicial statement on the subject. While the Court is not, bound
by ;a doctrine of stare decisis, and was quiick to point out that:
.. .The appraisal of -a reseryvation and the effect of objections
thai -might be made to it depend upon the particular circumstances
of each individual case . . ,,1 its opinion must inevitably be
a persuasive force in the future, to-the Court as well as to all mem-
bers of the interiational community. Furthermore, the Court did,
remark that the questions posed were "abstract in character," and
that the Court-sought-its:replies '-in the-ruls'of law relating to the
effect to be given to the intention-of the parties'to multilateral con-
ventions. 4 3 - This being so,- its -possible' effect on" the legal sig-.
nificance"of the -_Amdrcan rese&tioii .to - the Optional- Clause
should not be disregarded..
It is true that formal bbjectioiis to the 'U. S. reservation have
not been forthcoming; but in view of the divergence of opinions as
to 'whether and under what circumstances mere silence connotes
consent,44 it would seem that a party to the Statute might not be
deemed ipso facto to have waived its objection solely because it
has not yet raised it. Particularly-is this true when the sweeping
nature-of -the-Amer4ean-reserv;at4on-is--taken into account.
41. Ibd.
42. SuPra note 33; 45 Am. J. INT'L L. at 586.
43.-ubid. a ..
44. Sup-a o-e1.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
If the United States reservation is genuinely subject to the
criticisms raised by legal writers, 5 it would appear that the uni-
lateral exemption from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
is fundamentally incompatible with the purposes of the Statute.
Certainly the very existence of the reservation has the effect of
reducing the prestige and effectiveness of the Court, and its inter-
position would effectively deny to the Court the jurisdiction which
it was intended would be conferred by acceptance of the Optional
Clause.
Furthermore, the Statute of the Court may present a stronger
case for the operation of the compatibility test than did the Geno-
cide Convention. For the Convention, as was pointed out by the
Court, was intended primarily as a universal affirmation of ideals
and principles embodied therein. A reservation to one or another
of its clauses, therefore, should not preclude acceptance by the
reserving state, for the aim of the Convention is, basically, uni-
versal application. While the effect of a given reservation might
be to weaken the force of the Convention, it can be argued that
this result is more than balanced by the practical goal of securing
the widest possible acceptance of the aims of the Convention gen-
erally.
The Statute of the Court, however, is of a different character.
Although its widespread acceptance throughout the international
community is greatly to be desired, it is clear that in yielding to
the jurisdiction of the Court a state is not merely pronouncing its
approval of a humane and universal ideal, but is actually yielding
something of its own sovereignty and entering into a clear-cut
and binding legal commitment which could be of far-reaching sig-
nificance. That is, the Statute is in a sense a contractual, not a
law-making treaty.46 It follows, therefore, that the acceptancr
must be effective or it is nugatory; i. e., that the prestige and pur-
poses of the Statute ought to be maintained, even at the risk of
restricting the universality of its acceptance. Accordingly, a reser-
vation which is incompatible with the Statute could be considered
as precluding the reserving state from becoming a party thereto.
If the above arguments are sound, it would appear that the
American reservation may have "tough sledding" ahead, should
it be raised in any future litigation involving the United States.
If the Court adheres to and refines its pronouncement of the "com-
45. See, e.g., supra note. 31.
46. Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 Am. J. INT'L L. 94 et'seq.(1929).
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patibility" test in the Genocide opinion, the result may well be that
discussions of the United States reservation will no longer deal
with its wisdom or practicality, but rather, will be centered around
the question whether the reservation itself is not legally invalid;
or at least, whether the United States could not be open to serious
attack on this score, should we at some future date attempt to in-
voke its protection.
Morton Mendelsohn
JURISDICTION AND FREE SPEECH PROBLEMS
IN PEACEFUL PICKETING
The law of peaceful picketing, especially in view of the latest
set of decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court
and the New York Court of Appeals, presents an unusual array
of problems. The most important of these are the most basic: what
can be done about peaceful picketing, and who can do it? An at-
tempt will be made here to answer these questions, with special
reference to the latest important cases: Wood v. O'Grady1 for
the "what", Garner v. Teamsters2 and Construction Workers
v. Laburnums for the "by whom". By way of establishing land-
marks, it can be said that the first problem is largely tied up with
First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of speech and Section
7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, while the second involves such concepts
as federal pre-emption and the jurisdictional criteria of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
Concerning the conduct that may be restrained, the Supreme
Court has defined its conception of picketing in about a dozen
cases decided in the past fifteen years. After a few early cases in
which picketing was thought to be equatable with speech,4 it was
decided that picketing was really a complex activity, and that
speech was only one of numerous elements involved. However,
since speech is to a large extent a protected activity, it is neces-
sary to treat picketing with some deference, usually by attempting
in some way to balance the respective interests of management,
labor and the general public. If, for example, a statute is so
broadly drawn as to outlaw all picketing, thereby favoring man-
agement too highly over labor and the public, that statute is in-
1. Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N. Y. 552; 122 N. E. 2d 386 (1954).
2. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U. S.
485 -(1953).
3. United Construction Workers Affiliated with United Mine Workers of America
v. Laburnuni Construction Corporatin. 347 U. S. 656 (1954).
4. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S.
106 (1940).
5. Infra notes 8-26.
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